The AND-OR game: Equilibrium Characterization (Working Paper) by Hassidim, Avinatan et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
21
0.
17
57
v1
  [
cs
.G
T]
  5
 O
ct 
20
12
The AND-OR game: Equilibrium
Characterization
(working paper)
Avinatan Hassidim1, Haim Kaplan2 , Yishay Mansour2, and Noam Nisan3
1 Bar-Ilan University and Google Inc.
2 Tel Aviv University
3 Microsoft Research and Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Abstract. We consider a simple simultaneous first price auction for
multiple items in a complete information setting. Our goal is to com-
pletely characterize the mixed equilibria in this setting, for a simple, yet
highly interesting, AND-OR game, where one agent is single minded and
the other is unit demand.
1 Introduction
Walrasian equilibrium is one of the most basic models in economic theory. Items
are priced in such a way that for each item either the market clears (supply
equals demand) or if there is an excess supply it is priced at zero. When there
is a Walrasian equilibrium, it captures nicely the “right” pricing of items. Un-
fortunately, Walrasian equilibria are guarantee to exists only for limited classes
of agents’ valuations, namely gross-substitute valuations.
A different way of presenting the market is to auction the items simultane-
ously, and analyze the resulting equilibria. For simultaneous first price auction,
the resulting pure Nash equilibria are in one-to-one correspondence to the Wal-
rasian equilibria, with the same prices and allocations [3, 2]. Considering the
market as a simultaneous first price auction allows us to consider it as a game,
and study the resulting equilibria. Fortunately, there is always a mixed Nash
equilibrium, with some tie breaking rule, and approximate Nash equilibrium
with any tie breaking rule [3].
A typical example of a case where there are no Walrasian equilibria is when
there are two agents, one is single minded while the other is unit demand. The
AND-OR game is exactly this setting, with two items. The AND valuation is 1 if
it gets both items and zero otherwise, while the OR has a value of v for any
single item (or both) and zero otherwise. For v > 1/2 there is no Walrsian
equilibrium (or equivalently, pure Nash equilibrium) and this is the interesting
and challenging case we focus on in this paper. A specific mixed Nash equilibrium
for the AND-OR game was presented in [3] (we review it in Section 2).
In this work we completely characterize the resulting mixed Nash equilib-
ria of the AND-OR game. We show that while the equilibrium is technically not
unique, it is almost unique. More precisely we show that all mixed Nash equilib-
ria to the AND-OR game have the same marginal bid distributions for each item.
The resulting prices and utilities of the AND and OR agents are the same in all
mixed Nash equilibria. We complement our characterization with a study of the
properties of these equilibria.
Related Work: There is a recent interest in algorithmic game theory to study
simple simultaneous and sequential auctions to allocate multiple goods. Bhawalkar
and Roughgarden [1] studied second price simultaneous auctions and their Price
of Anarchy (PoA). They show that under the assumption of conservative bidding
the PoA for sub-modular valuations is a constant and for sub-additive valuations
it is logarithmic.
Hassidim et al. [3] studied a market which is based on first price auctions.
They show that the pure equilibria correspond to Walarsian prices, and prove
that a mixed Nash equilibrium always exists4. Similar to [1], they show for sub-
modular valuations a constant PoA and for sub-additive valuations a logarithmic
PoA.
Leme at al. [4] studied a sequential auctioning of the items, where the solution
concept is a sub-game perfect equilibrium. They show that a pure sub-game
perfect equilibrium always exists, and that for unit demand buyers the PoA is
at most 2 while for submodular buyers it might be unbounded.
Szentes [5] studied a game with two identical bidders and two identical items
in the full information model, where both bidders are either sub-additive or
supper-additive. In addition to simple pure Nash equilibria, he exhibits a family
of symmetric mixed Nash equilibria. This work was extended in [7] to three
items (where each of the two agent desires at least two of the items) and in [6]
to multiple items and agents (where again, each agent desires a strict majority
of the items). All the above works exhibit specific symmetric mixed equilibria,
and none of them address the characterization of all mixed Nash equilibria.
2 The AND-OR Game: Model and preliminaries
We have two players an AND player and OR player. The AND player has a value
of 1 if he gets both the items in M = {1, 2}, and the OR player has a value of
v if she gets any item in M . Formally, vand(M) = 1 and for S 6= M we have
vand(S) = 0, also, vor(T ) = v for T 6= ∅ and vor(∅) = 0. Both players have
a quasi-linear utility with respect to money, i.e., getting subset S and paying
price p has a utility of u(S) = v(S) − p, and are risk neutral. We assume a full
information setting, namely both players know each other’s valuation.
In the AND-OR game both players participate in two simultaneous first price
auctions, one for each item. Namely, each player places bids (x1, x2) where xi
is the bid on item i. The highest bidder on each item wins it and pays its bid.
We will denote by H the maximum allowed bid in the game, so 0 ≤ x, y ≤ H .
(Clearly it suffices to have H ≤ max(1, v).) Completely specifying a first price
4 the issue is that the prices are continuous.
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auction requires a tie breaking rule, which specifies the winner in case of identical
bids. We make the assumption that the tie breaking rule only depends on the
bids for the tied item (and not on the bids on the other item), and allow for a
randomized tie breaking rule.
When v ≤ 1/2 there is a Walresian equilibrium for any price p ∈ [v, 1/2] per
item. This implies a pure Nash Equilibrium in which both players bid p on each
item, and the AND player wins both items (assuming the tie breaking rule favors
AND). For this reason we are interested in the case when v > 1/2. It is easy to
verify that in this case is no Walresian equilibrium. For completeness we show
that there is no pure Nash equilibrium.
Claim. There is no pure Nash equilibrium in the AND-OR game.
Proof. Assume for contradiction there was a pure Nash equilibrium with some
tie breaking rule. Let the AND bid (x, y). Since the AND value is 1, if x + y > 1
the AND has a negative utility for any best response of the OR. In the case that
x + y ≤ 1, the best response of the OR is to out bid the lower bid of the AND.
Therefore, AND will have a non-negative utility only if it bids (0, 0). In case that
AND bids (0, 0), the OR wins one item at a price of at most ǫ. But then the AND
can deviate and bid (2ǫ, 2ǫ) and have a positive utility. Contradiction. ⊓⊔
Next, we describe the mixed Nash equilibrium from [3].
– The AND player bids (y, y) where 0 ≤ y ≤ 1/2 according to cumulative
distribution F ∗and(y) = (v − 1/2)/(v − y) (where F
∗
and(y) = Pr[bid ≤ y]). In
particular, There is an atom at 0: Pr[y = 0] = 1− 1/(2v).
– The OR player bids (x, 0) with probability 1/2 and (0, x) with probability
1/2, where 0 ≤ x ≤ 1/2 is distributed according to cumulative distribution
F ∗or(x) = x/(1− x).
Note that since the OR player does not have any mass points in his distri-
bution, the equilibrium holds for any tie breaking rule. The proof that this is
indeed an equilibrium is in [3]. The main goal of this paper is to characterize the
mixed Nash equilibria of the AND-OR game, and to show that this is “essentially”
the only mixed Nash equilibrium.
3 Characterization of the mixed Nash equilibria
The following theorem is our main result which characterizes the mixed Nash
equilibria of the AND-OR game. The OR player has to play the mixed strategy
F ∗or. The AND player can play various mixed strategies, but their marginal bid
distribution on each item is identical to F ∗and, and the probability mass at (0, 0)
is the same as of F ∗and. While there is more than a single equilibrium, they all
have “essentially” the same outcomes, i.e., the same expected utilities, payments,
and allocation probabilities.
Theorem 1. A pair of strategies (Fand, For) is an equilibrium of the AND-OR
game if and only if
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1. OR’s strategy is For = F
∗
or.
2. AND’s strategy has the same marginal distributions of the bids for each item
as F ∗and: Fand(x,H) = F
∗
and(x,H) and Fand(H, y) = F
∗
and(H, y) for all x, y,
and the same probability of (0, 0): Fand(0, 0) = F
∗
and(0, 0).
Furthermore, Fand is weakly dominated as a strategy by F
∗
and and the following
quantities are the same as in the equilibrium (F ∗and, F
∗
or): (1) The allocation
probabilities, i.e. the probabilities of each player winning each bundle. (2) The
expected payments, and utilities of each player. Thus also the expected revenue
and social welfare.
The proof of the above theorem is quite involved, and most of the paper is
devoted to it. In the following we give a high level view of the proof. We start
with preliminary set-up. In Section 3.1 we show that the support of the bids of
each player for each item is (essentially) an interval, with both players having
the same upper bound. In Section 3.2 we observe that OR must get non-zero
utility. In Section 3.3 we show that without loss of generality we can increase
the correlation between the bids of AND on the two items without changing
its marginal distribution on each item. This allows us to consider maximally
correlated distributions for AND. (We formally define in Section 3.3 what we
mean by maximally correlated.) In Section 3.4 we prove that the bids of OR must
be on the axis: i.e. either (0, x) or (x, 0); and then in Section 3.5 we show that
AND must bid on the diagonal, i.e., (x, x). At this point we derive, in Section 3.6
the exact form of the equilibrium distributions. Section 3.7 puts everything back
together showing how the main theorem is implied.
3.1 The Bids on Each Item form an Interval
The results in this section apply to any equilibrium in a market with two bidders
and any number of items. We still state these results using the names AND and
OR for the players but we only assume that (Fand, For) are an equilibrium of
some market game. We do not rely in this section on the specific form of the
utilities of AND and OR, but only on the fact that our game is a simultaneous first
price auction. This implies that Lemma 2 also holds with the roles of AND and
OR reversed.
Lemma 1. The highest bids of the two players on a particular item are equal.
I.e. Fand(x,H) = 1 if and only if For(x,H) = 1 (and similarly for the other
items.)
Proof. Assume that For(x0, H) = 1 for some x0. For any bid (x, y) of AND, with
x > x0, AND gets strictly lower utility than (x0+ǫ, y) (for any ǫ < x−x0) since it
wins in exactly the same cases (x, y) won, and always pays strictly less. It follows
that no bid with x > x0 is a best-response for AND, thus AND always bids at most
x0 on the first item, i.e., Fand(x0, H) = 1. The other direction is analogous. ⊓⊔
Given Lemma 1 it is possible to define the “highest bid” on an item: h1 =
min{x | Fand(x,H) = 1} = min{x | For(x,H) = 1} and h2 = min{y |
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Fand(H, y) = 1} = min{y | For(H, y) = 1} (where the minimum is actually
achieved due to the right-continuity of CDFs.) We will argue below that in fact
h1 = h2.
Lemma 2. Let 0 < b < c such that OR never bids between b and c on an item,
i.e., For(b,H) = For(c,H) and such that both players sometimes bid at most b,
i.e., For(b,H) > 0 and Fand(b,H) > 0. Then both players always bid at most b,
i.e. For(b,H) = Fand(b,H) = 1.
Proof. First, if OR never bids above c, i.e., For(c,H) = 1, then also For(b,H) =
For(c,H) = 1 and by Lemma 1 also Fand(b,H) = 1.
Otherwise, for a contradiction, assume OR bids above c. Define d to be the
infimum bid of OR above b: d = inf{x | For(x,H) > For(b,H)}. This implies
that for any ǫ > 0 the OR bids in [d, d+ ǫ) with positive probability. We show a
sequence of properties that depends on d:
(I) AND does not bid in the range (b, d) on that item (i.e., Fand(x,H) = Fand(b,H)
for all b ≤ x < d). Assume for a contradiction that AND bids (x, y) for some
b < x < d. Now consider a deviation of AND that bids (b+ ǫ, y). Both (x, y) and
(b + ǫ, y) win in exactly in the same cases, however, with the bid (b + ǫ, y) AND
pays strictly less (for any ǫ < x− b). Since this occurs with positive probability,
we have a contradiction that (x, y) is a best response of AND.
(II) Assume AND player does not have an atom at d. Consider a deviation of the
OR player switching any bid for the first item which is in the range (d, d+ ǫ) (for
a small enough ǫ ≥ 0), with the bid (b + d)/2. The probability that AND bids
in (d, d + ǫ) goes to zero as ǫ goes to zero, since AND does not have an atom at
d. This upper bounds the loss of OR in the deviation. On the other hand, the
payments decrease by at least (d−b)/2 > 0 and this happens with positive prob-
ability (at least the probability that AND bids below b). Therefore we reached a
contradiction to the assumption that OR is best responding.
(III) Assume AND has an atom at d and the OR does not have an atom at d.
Consider a deviation where the AND switches the bid of d for the first item by
the bid (b+ d)/2. Since the OR does not have an atom at d, the probability that
AND wins does not change, and the payments go down by (d−b)/2 with constant
probability (at least the probability that OR bids below b.) Therefore we reached
a contradiction to the assumption that AND is best responding.
(IV) Assume both AND and OR have an atom at d. Now, look at the tie breaking
rule at d, it gives AND probability qd of wining the tie at d and OR a probability
of 1− qd winning. At least one of the players does not always win. That player
may want to increase its bid to d + ǫ and always win the item – this will be
strictly beneficial unless its expected utility from bidding d is exactly zero. But
in that case reducing its bid to b + ǫ will strictly increase its utility: winning
whenever he previously did and paying less (again, winning the item with these
bids has positive probability.)
We reached a contradiction to the assumption that OR bids above c, therefore
For(b,H) = 1. By Lemma 1 we have that Fand(b,H) = 1. ⊓⊔
5
3.2 OR Gets Positive Utility
Lemma 3. In any mixed Nash equilibrium (Fand, For) the expected utility of the
OR player is strictly positive.
Proof. For contradiction assume that the expected utility of the OR player is zero,
i.e., uor(Fand, For) = 0. Consider the following deviation of the OR player. Let
η = (0.5+v)/2 > 1/2. The OR player bids with probability 1/2 the bids (0, η) and
with probability 1/2 the bids (η, 0). Since we are at an equilibrium the expected
utility of this deviation is 0. This could happen only if the AND player always
bids in Fand above η for both items, i.e., Fand(η,H) = Fand(H, η) = 0.
If the AND player always bids above η for both items then he has a non-
negative utility only if he always loses both items. It follows that the OR player,
using For, always wins both items with a cost of at least η for each. However,
this implies that the OR player pays at least v + 0.5. Since the value of the OR
player is v she has a negative utility, which is a contradiction. ⊓⊔
Let por(x, y) be the probability that the OR wins at least one item with the
bid (x, y), i.e., por(x, y) = Fand(x,H) + Fand(H, y) − Fand(x, y). The following
simple corollary to Lemma 3 would be useful.
Corollary 1. In any mixed Nash equilibrium (Fand, For), if For(x, y) > 0 then
por(x, y) > 0.
Consider the highest bids h1 and h2. Clearly if h1 > h2 and h2 < v then the
OR can gain by deviating and bidding h2 + ǫ on the second item and 0 on the
first item whenever it used to bid y > h2 on the first item. If h1 > h2 = v then
OR cannot have positive utility contradicting Lemma 3. So we have the following
corollary.
Corollary 2. The highest bid of the players on the first item (h1) is equal to
the highest bid of the players on the second item (h2).
We let h = h1 = h2.
3.3 Identical Marginal Distributions and Correlation
It will be convenient to consider the projection of the joint bid distribution of a
player on the individual coordinates, i.e., the single items.
Definition 1. Two CDF’s F and F ′ are called Identical Marginal Distributions
if their marginals are identical. I.e., F (x,H) = F ′(x,H) for all x and F (H, y) =
F ′(H, y) for all y.
The following proposition takes advantage of the fact that the decision of
each auction depends only on the marginal distribution.
Proposition 1. If Fand and F
′
and are Identical Marginal Distributions then
against any strategy For:
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– Each item is won by each player with the same probability in (Fand, For) and
(F ′and, For).
– The expected payments of each player are the same in (Fand, For) and (F
′
and, For).
Note that the above proposition states that the probabilities of winning any
single item by any player are identical in (Fand, For) and (F
′
and, For), but the
probability of winning both items might differ.
Proposition 2. If Fand and F
′
and are Identical Marginal Distributions then, for
every For, the following conditions are equivalent:
1. uand(Fand, For) ≤ uand(F ′and, For).
2. uor(Fand, For) ≥ uor(F ′and, For).
3. Pr(Fand,For)[AND wins both items] ≤ Pr(F ′and,For)[AND wins both items].
4. Pr(Fand,For)[OR wins an item] ≥ Pr(F ′and,For)[OR wins an item]
5. Pr(Fand,For)[AND wins no items] ≤ Pr(F ′and,For)[AND wins no items].
Proof. Since Fand and F
′
and are Identical Marginal Distributions the expected
payments are identical for both players. This implies that the only parameter
that influences the utility is the probability of winning. (For the AND player,
winning both items, for the OR player, winning one of the two items.) Thus (1) is
equivalent to (3) and (2) is equivalent to (4). But notice that always exactly one
of AND or OR wins, and therefore if the probability that AND wins increases, then
the probability that OR wins decreases. It follows that (3) and (4) are equivalent.
Finally, since Fand and F
′
and are Identical Marginal Distributions the players win
each item with the same probability. Let p1 be the probability that AND wins
item 1 and p2 be the probability that AND wins item 2 (both with Fand and with
F ′and!). Then we have Pr[ANDwinsnoitem] = 1−p1−p2+Pr[ANDwinsbothitems]
and thus (3) and (5) are equivalent. ⊓⊔
An immediate corollary is that if the utilities of one player are identical, then
the utilities of the other player are also identical.
Corollary 3. Assume that Fand and F
′
and are Identical Marginal Distributions.
Then uand(Fand, For) = uand(F
′
and, For) iff uor(Fand, For) = uor(F
′
and, For)
A very important building block in our proof is the notion of maximally
correlated. Intuitively, if the support of a distribution is on a monotone increasing
line, then this distribution is maximally correlated. Since we want to show that
the AND player support is essentially the diagonal, this would be very useful to
characterize its bid distribution.
Definition 2. For a CDF Fand define F¯and(x, y) = min(Fand(x,H), Fand(H, y)).
Fand is called maximally correlated if Fand = F¯and.
Note that F¯and(x,H) = min(Fand(x,H), Fand(H,H)) = min(Fand(x,H), 1) =
Fand(x,H), and therefore the following proposition holds.
Proposition 3. Every CDF Fand is Identical Marginal Distribution to F¯and.
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The following proposition claims that F¯and stochastically dominates Fand.
Proposition 4. For every (x, y), Fand(x, y) ≤ F¯and(x, y). I.e. Fand stochasti-
cally dominates F¯and.
The following lemma shows that a maximally correlated strategy F¯and weakly
dominates the original strategy Fand .
Lemma 4. Every Fand is weakly dominated, as a strategy of AND, by F¯and.
Proof. Fix a pure bid (x, y) of OR and let For bid (x, y) with probability 1.
By Proposition 2 we have that uand(Fand, For) ≤ uand(F¯and, For) if and only if
Fand(x, y) = Pr(Fand,For)[AND wins both items] ≤ Pr(F¯and,For)[AND wins both items] =
F¯and(x, y). The latter holds, since by Proposition 4 we have Fand(x, y) ≤ F¯and(x, y).
⊓⊔
The following lemma shows that if we have an equilibrium (Fand, For), and
we replace Fand by F¯and, then we still remain in an equilibrium. The main part
of the proof is showing that the OR strategy remains a best response to F¯and.
Lemma 5. If (Fand, For) is a Nash equilibrium then (F¯and, For) is a Nash equi-
librium. Moreover it produces exactly the same distribution on allocations, pay-
ments, and utilities as does (Fand, For).
Proof. By Lemma 4, F¯and dominates Fand so uand(Fand, For) ≤ uand(F¯and, For).
Since (Fand, For) is an equilibrium, then uand(Fand, For) = uand(F¯and, For) and
by Corollary 3 we also have that uor(Fand, For) = uor(F¯and, For). Since For is
best response to Fand we have that uor(Fand, For) ≥ uor(Fand, F ′or), for any F
′
or.
Since by Lemma 4 we also have that uand(F¯and, F
′
or) ≥ uand(Fand, F
′
or) then
by Proposition 2, uor(F¯and, F
′
or) ≤ uor(Fand, F
′
or). Thus,
uor(F¯and, F
′
or) ≤ uor(Fand, F
′
or) ≤ uor(Fand, For) = uor(F¯and, For),
which implies that For is a best response to F¯and. From Proposition 2 we get
that the allocations, payments, and utilities are identical. ⊓⊔
We will continue the analysis assuming that Fand = F¯and is already maxi-
mally correlated and will derive the form of the equilibrium under this assump-
tion. By Lemma 5 this characterization will then apply to other distributions
that are Identical Marginal Distributions to Fand, and form an equilibrium with
For. We will keep the notation F¯and to stress that it is maximally correlated.
3.4 OR Bids on the Axis
Our approach here is to first show that OR must always place a certainly-loosing
bid on one of the items; and then to show that AND bids arbitrarily low on each
item, implying that certainly-loosing bids of OR must be 0.
We start by defining the low bids for AND in a distribution Fand:
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Definition 3. L1and = inf{x | Fand(x,H) > 0} and L
2
and = inf{y | Fand(H, y) >
0}.
Definition 5 specifies similar quantities for OR but in a different way.
Definition 4. Given a distribution of AND, Fand, we say that a bid x of OR for
item i is low, if either x = 0 or OR with bid x always looses item i to AND. We
denote a low bid of OR by ℓior.
By definition, a bid x > 0 of OR is low if x < Liand or if x = L
i
and and either
AND doesn’t have an atom at Liand or AND always wins the tie for item i at L
i
and.
Lemma 6. Assume that (F¯and, For) is an equilibrium, then the OR player bids
a low bid on exactly one of the items. Moreover the probability of bidding low on
each one of the items is positive.
Proof. Since F¯and is maximally correlated, we have that the probability that
the OR wins at least one item using a bid (x, y) is max{F¯and(x,H), F¯and(H, y)}
(this holds since the probability of winning at least one item is por(x, y) =
F¯and(x,H) + F¯and(H, y) − F¯and(x, y), and since F¯and is maximum correlated
F¯and(x, y) = min{F¯and(x,H), F¯and(H, y)}). Assume that F¯and(x,H) ≥ F¯and(H, y).
Consider a deviation of the OR where she bids (x, 0) instead of (x, y). The prob-
ability that OR wins at least one item is the same, i.e., por(x, y) = por(x, 0). The
payment decreases by y times the probability that OR wins the second item. This
is a strict decrease unless y is low. This establishes that in each bid (x, y) in the
support of For at least one of x or y must be low.
We now want to show that For(ℓ
1
or, ℓ
2
or) = 0 for any low bids ℓ
1
or and ℓ
2
or.
Namely, the probability that the OR has both bids low is zero. Assume by con-
tradiction that For(ℓ
1
or, ℓ
2
or) > 0 for some low bids ℓ
1
or and ℓ
2
or and consider the
following cases where OR bids (x, y) such that x ≤ ℓ1or and y ≤ ℓ
2
or:
(1) OR always looses both items. This implies that the OR has zero utility, con-
tradicting Lemma 3.
(2) OR wins with positive probability. Since OR always looses with a low value
which is not zero we may assume that either For(ℓ
1
or, 0) > 0 or For(0, ℓ
2
or) > 0.
We assume that For(ℓ
1
or, 0) > 0, the case where For(0, ℓ
2
or) > 0 is symmetric.
We also denote the probability that OR wins with a bid (x, 0) where x ≤ ℓ1or by
p = por(ℓ
1
or, 0) > 0. Consider now the a deviation for the AND player, in which
it increases every bid on every item by ǫ < p/3. This increases its probability of
winning (and its expected welfare) by at least p, and increases its payments by
2p/3, which gives a net utility gain of at least p/3.
Therefore, we have established that the OR always bids one low value and
never bids both values low.
It remains to show that OR must place a low bid with positive probability on
each item. By contradiction, assume that the OR always bids low only on one of
the items, say item 1. We have two cases:
(1) The AND player always wins item 1. Let ℓ¯1or be the supermum of the (low)
bids of OR on item 1. Then it is clear that in equilibrium the AND never bids
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above ℓ¯1or + ǫ on item 1, for any ǫ > 0. Now consider item 2. We have two cases
depending on the relation between v and 1: (1a) If v < 1 then (given that the
AND always wins item 1 and no-matter in what price) the AND player will win
item 2 and pay at most v+ ǫ. Since the AND player wins both items the OR player
has zero utility, contradicting Lemma 3. (1b) If v > 1 then the OR player always
wins item 2. This implies that the AND player always loses, and has negative
utility unless ℓ¯1or = 0. However, in this case the OR player can deviate and bid
(2ǫ, 0) and always win item 1, contradicting the assumption that we have an
equilibrium.
(2) The OR player wins item 1 with positive probability p > 0. This can happen
only if ℓ¯1or = 0. Let δ denote the expected price of item 2. If δ = 0, the AND
player can strictly increase its utility by bidding (p/3, p/3). If δ > 0, then the
auction has expected revenue at least δ, and therefore the expected utility of the
OR player is at most v−η for some η > 0. Since the OR player is always bidding 0
on item 1 the AND player will bid at most ǫ = η/3 on item 1 (this is true for any
ǫ > 0). But then bidding (2η/3, 0) is a profitable deviation for the OR player.
We have established that the OR player has to bid a low bid with a positive
probability on each item. ⊓⊔
Now let us define for OR Lior, which is different from the definition of AND.
Definition 5. L1or = inf{x | For(x, y) > 0 and y is low} and L
2
or = inf{y |
For(x, y) > 0 and x is low}.
Lemma 7. Assume that (F¯and, For) is an equilibrium and L
1
and = L
1
or = l. Then
at most one of the players can have an atom at l in the marginal distribution of
item 1.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that they both have atoms at l. By Lemma 6,
the OR player never has both bids low, so L1or cannot be low. Since L
1
or is not
low, the OR wins the tie with non-zero probability.
Now consider the following cases depending on L1and:
(1) If L1and < 1 then AND can gain by always increasing both its bids by ǫ: The
payments increases by at most 2ǫ but the winning probability increases by a
constant. (AND now wins the atom.)
(2) Assume L1and ≥ 1. The ANDmust always bid 0 on item 2, since if it bids higher,
when OR bids low on 2 (which happens with positive probability by Lemma 6)
AND has negative utility. In this case OR gains by bidding ǫ on item 2 and 0 on
item 1. It will always win item 2 and pay ǫ whereas previously OR paid at least
1 when it won item 1, which occurred with constant probability. ⊓⊔
We now show that the low values of AND are indeed zero.
Lemma 8. L1and = L
2
and = 0.
Proof. Assume by way of contradiction that L1and > 0, and let us look at the
relation between L2and and L
2
or. By the previous lemma if L
2
and = L
2
or = l then
at most one of the players can have an atom at l, so we are left with two cases.
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CASE I: If L2and > L
2
or or L
2
and = L
2
or but AND has no atom at L
2
and. Consider
the expected utility of OR when it bids x ∈ [L2or, L
2
or + ǫ] on item 2 (with a low
bid on the first item). OR probability of winning with such bids goes to zero as
ǫ goes to zero. Therefore OR’s utility goes to zero, in contradiction to Lemma 3,
which shows that OR has a strictly positive utility.
CASE II: If L2and < L
2
or or L
2
and = L
2
or but OR has no atom at L
2
and. Let us
consider the set B(ǫ) of all the bids of AND which are coordinate-wise no larger
than (L1and+ǫ, L
2
and+ǫ) as ǫ approaches zero. First note that since L
1
and > 0 and
since by Lemma 6 OR bids low on item 1 with constant probability, the expected
payment of AND on B(ǫ) is some positive constant which is independent of ǫ. On
the other hand we show that the probability that AND wins with a bid in B(ǫ)
approaches 0 as ǫ approaches zero. This implies that there exists and ǫ > 0 such
that the AND has negative utility for B(ǫ) and hence a contradiction.
Consider the probability of AND winning both items with a bid in B(ǫ). By
Lemma 6 this is the sum of the probability that AND wins both items when OR
bids low on item 1 and the probability that AND wins both items when OR bids
low on item 2. We estimate these probabilities in the following cases.
(IIa) If OR bids low on the first item, then the probability AND wins the second
item with a bid in B(ǫ) goes to zero with ǫ by our assumption that L2and < L
2
or
or L2and = L
2
or but OR has no atom at L
2
and.
(IIb) If OR bids low on the second item, then it cannot bid low on the first item so
it bids at least L1and on item 1. If AND does not have an atom at L
1
and, then OR bids
strictly above L1and (L
1
and is a low value), therefore, AND’s winning probability
with B(ǫ) goes to zero with ǫ. If AND has an atom at L1and, by Lemma 7, OR
cannot have an atom at L1and so the probability that OR bids less than L
1
and + ǫ
goes to zero as ǫ approaches zero, and hence the probability of AND winning the
first item goes too zero. Hence, we have established that the probability that
AND wins goes to zero as ǫ approaches zero. ⊓⊔
By Lemma 8, any positive bid of OR has a positive probability of winning,
hence the only low bids of OR is zero.
Corollary 4. OR always bids either (x, 0) with x > 0 or (0, y) with y > 0. Both
of these events happen with positive probability.
3.5 AND Bids on the Diagonal
In this section we are considering an equilibrium (F¯and, For) of the AND-OR game,
where F¯and maximally correlated.
Lemma 9. Pr(x,y)∼F¯and [x 6= y] = 0.
Proof. By way of contradiction, without loss of generality assume Pr(x,y)∼Fand [x <
y] > 0. So for some 0 < b < c < H we will have Pr[AND bids in [0, b)× (c,H)] > 0
(since the former event is the union over the countable choices of the latter over
all rationals 0 < b < c < H). Now since F¯and is maximally correlated, either
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F¯and(b, c) = F¯and(b,H) or F¯and(b, c) = F¯and(H, c). However, the former possi-
bility is in contradiction to Pr[AND bids in [0, b) × (c,H)] > 0 so we must have
F¯and(b, c) = F¯and(H, c). This means that whenever AND bids at most c on the
second item, it also bids at most b on the first item.
In such a case, any bid (0, y) for OR, where b < y < c is strictly dominated
the bid (b, 0) (since OR wins at least whenever (0, y) wins, pays strictly less, and
this happens with positive probability since L2and = 0). Therefore the OR never
bids (0, y) where b < y < c.
However AND does bid at least c on the second item with positive probability.
This contradicts Lemma 2. ⊓⊔
3.6 The exact forms
In this section we show that the previous lemma imply that an equilibrium
(F¯and, For) of the AND-OR game with F¯and maximally correlated, must have a
specific form.
Lemma 10. For(x, y) =
1
2x/(1 − x) +
1
2y/(1− y) for 0 ≤ x, y ≤ 1/2.
Proof. We know that OR bids 0 on exactly one of the items (Corollary 4) so
For(x, y) = For(x, 0) + For(0, y). Let α = For(0, h) be the probability that OR
bids 0 on the first item, and let 1− α = For(h, 0). Assume that AND bids (x, y).
With probability α OR bids 0 on the first item and then 1) AND wins the first item
and pays x for it, and 2) AND wins the second item with probability For(0, y).
Similarly, with probability 1 − α OR bids 0 on the second item and then AND 1)
wins the second item and pays y for it, and 2) wins the first item with probability
For(x, 0). So we conclude that uAND(x, y) = For(x, 0)(1− x) + For(0, y)(1− y)−
αx− (1 − α)y.
Now notice that uAND(x, y) is the sum of a function g1(x) = For(x, 0)(1−x)−
αx, that depends only on x and a function g2(y) = For(0, y)(1−y)−(1−α)y that
depends only on y. We claim that g1(x) must be a constant for all x ∈ [0, h] and
g2(y) must be a constant for all y ∈ [0, h]. We prove this claim for g1, the proof
for g2 is the same. Assume for a contradiction that g1(x1) > g1(x2) for some
x1, x2 ∈ [0, h]. Then the bid (x1, x2) of AND strictly dominates the bid (x2, x2)
in contradiction to the fact that (x2, x2) is a best response of AND for For which
follows from Lemma 2 (the support of AND is an interval), Lemma 8 (the interval
starts at 0), and Lemma 9 (AND bids on the diagonal).
As OR does not have an atom at (0, 0), For(0, y) and For(x, 0) approach 0 as
x and y approach 0, respectively. Therefore uAND(x, y) approaches 0 as x and y
approach 0. It follows that we must have that g1(x) = For(x, 0)(1− x)−αx = 0
for all 0 ≤ x ≤ h, and similarly g2(y) = 0 for all 0 ≤ y ≤ h. I.e. For(x, 0) =
αx/(1−x) and For(0, y) = (1−α)y/(1−y) for all 0 ≤ x, y ≤ h. In particular since
For(h, h) = For(0, h)+For(h, 0) = 1, we have that αh/(1−h)+(1−α)h/(1−h) =
h/(1 − h) = 1 which implies that h = 1/2. But then substituting h = 1/2 into
the expression we get For(0, h) = For(0, 1/2) = 1 − α. But by its definition
α = For(0, h) so α = 1/2 and the lemma follows. ⊓⊔
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Lemma 11. F¯and(x, y) =
v−1/2
v−min(x,y) .
Proof. Since AND bids on the diagonal, clearly F¯and(x, y) = F¯and(min(x, y),min(x, y)),
so it suffices to characterize F¯and(x, x) for all x. The utility for OR for bidding
(x, 0) is (v − x)F¯and(x, x). By Corollary 4 (lowest bid of OR is 0), Corollary 2
(OR and AND have the same highest bid), Lemma 10 (this highest bid is 1/2),
and Lemma 2 (OR bids in an interval) we know that the support of OR is the
interval (0, 1/2). So for every 0 < x < 1/2, (x, 0) is a best response to AND
and thus (v − x)F¯and(x, x) is a constant independent of x. For x = 1/2 we
know that F¯and(1/2, 1/2) = 1 and thus this constant is v − 1/2. It follows that
(v − x)F¯and(x, x) = v − 1/2 for all x, i.e., F¯and(x, x) = (v − 1/2)/(v − x), and
the lemma follows. ⊓⊔
3.7 Completing the Proof
Now let us put everything together to prove Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1:We start by showing the necessary conditions for an equilib-
rium. Take an equilibrium (Fand, For). As Lemma 5 shows (F¯and, For) is also an
equilibrium, with the same allocations, payments, and utilities. From Lemmas
10 and 11 we have that For(x, y) = (x/(1 − x) + y/(1− y))/2 and F¯and(x, y) =
min(Fand(x,H), Fand(H, y)) = (v − 1/2)/(v −min(x, y)). By Lemma 4, Fand is
dominated by F¯and.
To show that Fand(0, 0) = F¯and(0, 0), assume for a contradiction that Fand(0, 0) 6=
F¯and(0, 0). Since by definition F¯and(x, y) ≥ Fand(x, y), we have that Fand(0, 0) <
F¯and(0, 0) = (v − 1/2)/v. For x, y > 0 the utility of OR from the bid (x, y) is
uor(x, y) = Fand(x,H)(v − x) + Fand(H, y)(v − y) − Fand(x, y) · v (for x = 0
or y = 0 the atom of Fand at x = 0 and y = 0 may cause the utility to be
lower depending on the tie breaking rule). Now let x and y approach 0 and
we get at the limit a utility of v · (Fand(0, H) + Fand(H, 0) − Fand(0, 0)) >
v · (F¯and(0, H) + F¯and(H, 0) − F¯and(0, 0)) = v · F¯and(0, 0) = v − 1/2 (where
the inequality follows since the marginal distributions of Fand and F¯and are the
same). Thus for small enough x and y the utility of OR is strictly greater than
v − 1/2. This however contradicts our derivation of For whose support includes
the bid (0, 1/2) for which uor(0, 1/2) = v − 1/2, a contradiction to it being a
best response to Fand. Therefore, Fand(0, 0) = F¯and(0, 0).
We now show the sufficient conditions for an equilibrium. For the fixed dis-
tributions F¯and(x, y) = (v − 1/2)/(v −min(x, y)) and For(x, y) = (x/(1 − x) +
y/(1 − y))/2 one may directly verify that (F¯and, For) is an equilibrium (as was
shown in [3]). Now take Fand such that F¯and(x, y) = (v − 1/2)/(v −min(x, y)),
Fand(0, 0) = (v − 1/2)/v, and Fand(x, 0) = Fand(0, 0) = Fand(0, y).5 We first
need to show that Fand is also a best response to For (and not just F¯and), that
is we need to show that uand(Fand, For) = uand(F¯and, For). By Proposition 2
this will happen whenever the probability that AND wins no item is the same in
5 This follows since F ∗and(0, 0) = Fand(0, 0) ≤ Fand(0, y) ≤ Fand(0,H) = F
∗
and(0, H) =
F ∗and(0, 0).
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both cases. Since Fand(x, 0) = Fand(0, 0) = Fand(0, y), the probability for AND
winning no item is exactly the probability that it bids (0, 0) times the probabil-
ity that OR wins the tie at its 0 bid, which is the same in Fand and F¯and since
Fand(0, 0) = F¯and(0, 0).
Finally we need to show that For is also a best response to Fand. As before,
for 0 < x, y, the utility of OR from a bid (x, y) is uor(x, y) = Fand(x,H)(v −
x) + Fand(H, y)(v − y) − Fand(x, y)v. Notice that Fand(x,H) = F¯and(x,H) =
(v − 1/2)/(v − x) so the first and the second terms equal the constant v − 1/2.
It follows that the maximum utility is obtained as x and y approach 0 (since
this minimizes the last term F (x, y)). The utility of OR when x and y approach
0, approaches (from below) 2v − 1− Fand(0, 0)v = 2v − 1− F¯and(0, 0)v = (2v −
1) − (v − 1/2) = v − 1/2. Since Fand(x, 0) = Fand(0, 0) = Fand(0, y), we have
that the utility of OR is v − 1/2 at any point in the support of F ∗or, and hence it
is a best response. ⊓⊔
4 Properties of the equilibrium
We present few properties of the Nash equilibrium in Theorem 1. Our analysis is
a function of the value v (of the OR player). We analyze the probability that each
player wins, the expected revenue and the expected social welfare. By Theorem
1 all these quantities are identical in every Nash equilibrium. (The proofs and
the figures are in the Appendix.)
First, we derive the probability that the AND player wins (clearly the proba-
bility that the OR player wins is the complement). This probability is depicted
in Figure 1.
Lemma 12. The probability that the AND player wins is
ln(2)− 1
2
v + O
(
1
v2
)
and
for v = 1 this probability is 1/4.
Next we compute the expected revenue. The expected utility of the AND player
is 0 and therefore the revenue from the AND player equals to the probability that
it wins. It remains to compute the revenue from the OR player.
Theorem 2. The expected revenue from the OR player is 1 − ln 2 − O( 1v ). For
v = 1 the expected revenue from the OR player is 1/4.
The revenue from the OR player is plotted in Figure 2 as a function of the
value v. The revenue from the auction (i.e., sum of both players) is shown in
Figure 3.
Using the probability that each player wins, we can compute the expected
social welfare, which is (Pr[And wins] + v · Pr[OR wins]).
Theorem 3. The expected social welfare is v− ln(2)+1/2+ ln(2)−1/2v +O(1/v
2).
Figure 4 shows the Price of Anarchy of the equilibrium. That is we di-
vide the expected social welfare in equilibrium (Pr[And wins] + v · Pr[OR wins])
by the maximum social welfare, that is max{v, 1}. The difference max{v, 1} −
(Pr[And wins]+v ·Pr[OR wins]) is shown in Figure 5. The expected loss converges
to ln(2)− 0.5 ≈ 0.19 as the value v of the OR player goes to infinity.
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B Missing Proofs
Proof of Lemma 12: If v 6= 1 we get that
Pr[AND wins] =
∫ 1/2
0
F ′and(x)For(x)dx
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=∫ 1/2
0
v − 12
(v − x)2
x
1− x
dx
=
(
v −
1
2
)[
ln v−x1−x
(v − 1)2
−
v
(v − 1)(v − x)
]1/2
0
=
(
v −
1
2
)[
ln(2v − 1)
(v − 1)2
−
v
(v − 1)(v − 1/2)
−
ln v
(v − 1)2
+
1
v − 1
]
=
(
v −
1
2
)[
ln(2v − 1)− ln v
(v − 1)2
−
1/2
(v − 1)(v − 1/2)
]
=
(v − 1/2) ln(2 − 1v )−
1
2 (v − 1)
(v − 1)2
=
ln(2)− 12
v
+O
(
1
v2
)
For v = 1 a similar calculation shows that
Pr[AND wins | v = 1] =
1
2
∫ 1/2
0
x
(1− x)3
dx =
1
2
[
2x− 1
2(x− 1)2
]1/2
0
=
1
4
.
⊓⊔
Proof of Theorem 2:
Revenue(OR) =
∫ 1/2
0
xF ′or(x)Fand(x)dx
=
∫ 1/2
0
x
1
(1 − x)2
(v − 12 )
(v − x)
dx
=
(v − 12 )
(v − 1)2
[
v ln
(
1− x
v − x
)
+
(v − 1)
(1− x)
]1/2
0
=
(v − 12 )
(v − 1)2
[
v ln
( 1
2
v − 12
)
+
(v − 1)
1/2
−
(
v ln
1
v
+ (v − 1)
)]
=
(v − 12 )
(v − 1)2
[
v − 1− v ln 2 + v ln
v
v − 12
]
=
(v − 12 )
(v − 1)2
[
v − 1− v ln 2 + v ln(1 +
1
2
v − 12
)
]
=
(v − 12 )
(v − 1)2
[
v − 1− (v − 1) ln 2− ln 2 + v ln
(
1 +
1
2v − 1
)]
= (1 − ln 2)
v − 12
v − 1
−O
(
1
v
)
= 1− ln 2−O
(
1
v
)
= 0.3068−O
(
1
v
)
For v = 1 a similar calculation shows that the revenue of the OR player is
0.25. ⊓⊔
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C Missing Figures
In this section we present the missing figures. All the figures depict properties
of the equilibrium, as a function of the value of the OR player; the value of
the AND player is taken to be 1. The graphs are only presented for v > 0.5, as
otherwise there is a Walrasian equilibrium. In all the figures the asterisk depicts
the crossover point, in which the value of the OR player is 1.
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.5  1  1.5  2  2.5  3  3.5  4  4.5  5
value of OR
probability AND wins
Pr[And wins]
Fig. 1. The probability that the AND player wins which is the same as the revenue
generated from the AND player.
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Fig. 2. The revenue from the OR player.
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Fig. 3. The revenue from the OR player and the AND player.
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Fig. 4. The Price of Anarchy of the AND/OR game. This is the fraction of the optimal
social welfare obtained by the auction. For v < 1 it achieves a minimum of ≈ 0.818485
at v ≈ 0.643028. For v > 1 it achieves a minimum of ≈ 0.945682 at v ≈ 1.87999.
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Fig. 5. The additive loss in social welfare of the Nash equilibrium of the AND/OR game.
That is, the optimal social welfare minus the social welfare of the Nash equilibrium.
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